US-China relations: strategic competition cannot be the strategy, for the winner will only dominate fields of ruin
Our 4th Taihe Civilizations Forum is in full swing following no goal other than contributing to a reopening of meaningful channels of dialogue and action between the US and China, which have dried out. A war of words, military movements and cyberattacks have become the most visible and dangerous sign of interaction. The past cooperation–competition balance has shifted to a dangerous competition–confrontation situation. Security and economic competition are deepening and now include technology and ideology. Both sides have taken more risk in confronting each other. While the US is furious about its relative decline and lacks a grand strategy, China joined the free-world system at the height of the Cold War, but today it does not share the underlying values nor offer a credible way to contribute responsibly to that system. As long as the US wants everyone to become Westernized and China insists on its uniqueness, it will be impossible to find the new framework of cooperation desperately needed to address bigger challenges such as climate change, pandemics, inequality, or cybersecurity. While bipartisan political elites in the US have become alienated from China, an anti-American sentiment determines China’s politics and nationalism and increases centralized decision-making. This tension polarizes the world as other countries feel increasingly forced to take sides. Europe resists taking sides, despite its cultural and historical proximity to the US. Pressured by the US and assertive Chinese foreign policies, Europe does not allow itself to “become a political football in the great-power rivalry.” Yet, foreign politics remain at best paralyzed until the US elections, while businesses are frustrated and mitigating the risks of imposed restrictions.
Whatever the outcome, foreign policies on both sides will continue to be formulated in ways to achieve domestic objectives and deal with the disruptions of capitalism and modernization. This will ultimately limit the rate and extent of decoupling. Despite the bipartisan consensus, a difference will emerge between Biden’s and Trump’s China foreign policy approach. Both will seek changes in Chinese behavior affecting US interests and demand reciprocity. While Trump would act bilaterally and pursue greater economic nationalism like China, Biden would seek to mitigate risks through relying on a rules-based and multilateral approach that is best for the US and the international system. Should Biden win, he must reevaluate the China policy of the Trump administration, which would provide some time to restart the relationship. Such a restart appears inconceivable should Trump win reelection. For now, should the polls further diverge in the swing states towards Biden, China can expect further policy actions by the Trump administration that might even crossing the line.
This is where we are. Although any public attempt at understanding and rationalizing the position of the other will likely be met with suspicion and even hostility these days, especially when it comes to questions concerning human rights and territorial disputes, we have managed to bring together leading experts from both sides as well as other regions to exchange their views. All of the experts have emphasized that US–China relations are of global concern and that confrontation must be avoided, dialogue resumed, and credible measures taken. I agree. Competition cannot be the overarching strategy, for the winner will only “dominate fields of ruin” if we do not change the rules and direction of competition, or rather focus on cooperation instead.
